Abstract: Created in 2009 to " [synchronize] warfighting effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil authorities and international partners" the United States Cyber Command has spent the intervening years developing a foundation of cyber military doctrine, harnessing and integrating extant forces, and developing the critical mass needed to execute its global mission.
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Introduction -on the nature of cyberspace
Cyberspace -the word confounds and provokes in equal measure.
While many definitions of cyberspace argue the fine points of its composition, texture and context, it is clear by any definition that the domain is comprised of far more than technology alone. In its simplest form, it can be considered a meld of technology, people, and the behaviors and rules that bind the two 3 . Several consequences derive from this reality, foremost among them is that cyberspace constantly evolves, driven by the ebb, flow, and unceasing injects of new technologies, always evolving patterns of use, and the individual actions of hundreds of millions of users. And while this inherent complexity and dynamism of cyberspace is rightly perceived as a great good for the billions of people who have come to expect inexorable advances in the capabilities made available to them by the cyber domain, these same features offer a lucrative and high leverage means for people and organizations to misappropriate, degrade, or destroy assets and capabilities held in or dependent upon this shared space.
The result is a system whose properties are attributable to human behavior(s) as much as technology, and one which is largely devoid of physical boundaries or buffer zones that would afford some measure of time to detect and interdict oncoming threats to assets stored in or dependent on cyberspace. Lacking these margins, initiative and attendant agility is often ceded to the adversary who gets to pick the means, place and time of an attack which can then be effected with sufficient speed that a robust defense based on contemporaneous detection and reactive response is virtually impossible.
But the challenge of effecting speed, precision and [desired] impact in cyberspace operations is not confined to the defense alone. The dynamism of cyberspace cuts both ways, challenging the aggressor attempting to prosecute a sustained campaign, especially in the face of a now alerted and often unpredictable defender. For these reasons, maintaining the precision and staying power of an attack beyond an opening phase, across the dynamic realms of cyberspace, is a daunting proposition which must also be addressed in the foundations of supporting ISR.
US Cyber Command Role and its implications going forward
While this paper assumes the reader is familiar with the roles and missions of US Cyber Command, it is nonetheless useful to offer a brief reprise in order to center the paper's focus and establish foundations for further work.
The US Strategic Command fact page for US Cyber Command lists three main focus areas for the command: "… Defending the DoDIN [Department of Defense Information Network], providing support to combatant commanders for execution of their missions around the world, and strengthening our nation's ability to withstand and respond to cyber attack." 4 A fourth responsibility of Cyber Command to support US and allied deterrence efforts may be inferred and will also levy expectations on ISR support, reinforcing requirements derived from its primary missions.
The current commander US Cyber Command, ADM Mike Rogers, USN, added greater fidelity to this characterization in his 3 June 2015 Commander's Vision and Guidance for US Cyber Command:
"Our mission in cyberspace is to provide mission assurance for the operation and defense of the Department of Defense information environment, deter or defeat strategic threats to US interests and infrastructure, and support the achievement of Joint Force Commander objectives. Our challenge is to protect the things we value-freedom, liberty, prosperity, intellectual property, and personal information-without hindering the free flow of information that fosters growth and intellectual dynamism."
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Three key aspects of the resulting Cyber Command mission warrant highlighting:
1. Cyber Command is responsible for developing and deploying defensive capabilities in direct support of the DoDIN, and for participating in the defense of the "nation" against cyber attack(s); 2. Cyber Command is responsible for the development and execution of offensive capabilities in support of national objectives (sometimes through other combatant commanders); 3. Cyber Command is held to a high standard of precision in the application of its capabilities as reflected in ADM Rogers' statement that its activities must not hinder "free flow of information that fosters growth and intellectual dynamism." 6 Cyber Command's challenge of operating within, through and from its assigned domaincyberspace -is by no means straightforward or fully resolved. Elevated by the US Department of Defense in the late 2000's to the status of an "operational domain" 7 , the Department's development of doctrine and capabilities for cyberspace operations has been challenged by several factors, not least of which are: the paucity of directly applicable analogs from other operational domains (Sea, Land, Air and Space); the ambiguity of jurisdiction shared between civilian, and various public sector institutions, to include the military; the challenge of distinguishing between defensive reconnaissance and its near-twin, reconnaissance supporting incipient attack; and the lack of clear cut differences between DoD and private sector capabilities and, in a similar vein, clean margins between areas of responsibility as the DoD attempts to sustain, monitor, and, if needed, restore and defend key terrain in cyberspace. 8 These expectations combined with the realities of its operational domain create a high bar for US Cyber Command.
 Its participation in the defense of the Nation in cyberspace mandates that it be in a position to provide responsive capabilities when called upon through the traditional tasking process of the USG in support of the defense of infrastructure and systems largely sustained and operated by the private sector. This, in turn, requires Cyber Command to be cognizant of threats and network topologies that it does not control in real-time (in order to enable responsive support).  Its mandate to prepare and, on order, deliver offensive capability in support of national objectives requires it to be cognizant of campaign plans, relevant indications and warnings (especially in cyber space), and the doctrine, routines, rules and current topology of potential adversary systems and capabilities. While some of the intelligence sought will reveal insights that will remain valid for long periods of time (e.g., adversary doctrine), other facets (e.g., adversary capabilities and tactics) will change with much greater frequency, especially in the midst of an ongoing campaign. Equally important, the cyberspace environment, comprised of large swaths of private sector provisioned commodity technology and systems constantly changes in both its substance (technology) and patterns of use (human behavior). The sum of these change dynamics yields a requirement for ISR that places a high premium on currency: real-time, comprehensive, intelligence that stays apace with domains, tactics and actors whose salient characteristics constantly change.  Its mandate to achieve precision in the application of its capabilities calls out for an ability to see and discriminate between legitimate targets and protected persons, capabilities, and infrastructure at network speed (e.g., real-time). Note that the execution of campaigns (as opposed to one time strikes) will require that this comprehensive fidelity be sustained over time.
Taken in sum, the framing of Cyber Command's mission requires that it have real-time fine grained, current knowledge about adversary forces, capabilities, routines, operating venues, and intentions. While ISR has always been an important contributor to mission success for Department missions, it is, without a doubt, an essential predicate and enduring companion to mission success in the cyber realm. Whether operating in time of peace, contingency, or conflict, the demands for ISR in support of cyber operations are much the same -requiring a high intelligence operations tempo that enables the Command to go from a standing start to a precise and responsive engagement in the shortest possible time. 9 Equally important is ISR's role in detecting emergent conditions that inform decisions of policy makers and operational commanders in time to act and prevail, preserving the advantages of initiative and maneuver for the US and its allies.
Before proceeding on to the topic of how best to shape Cyber ISR, a brief treatment of tactics and strategy is in order.
Tactical and Strategic Foundations
While cyberspace tactics are likely to be best defined as a fluid set of activities where blue force(s) defense and offense share resources, insights, and leverage, it is useful to consider the unique circumstances of each. This will, in turn, inform the ISR best suited to enable them.
The challenge of Defense -deterring, anticipating, detecting, and countering Tactical advantage in cyberspace has long been ceded to the aggressor who can choose the means, time, and place of their transgression, leveraging cyber deficiencies across technology, people, or process to seize and retain the initiative in a domain where speed and agility matters.
Aggressors who achieve a degree of surprise greatly exacerbate the defender's challenge to find, fix, attribute as necessary, mitigate and recover. The principal issue will be one of speed -e.g., the party able to confidently maneuver at greater speed will achieve strategic advantage over the other.
An aggressor's ability to employ large numbers of devices, an inherent advantage derived from operating in and through cyberspace, yields even greater leverage that magnifies the resulting agility and consequent effects of the given attack. When married with adversary use of the anonymity that comes from working amongst large populations, or the increasingly rich set of capabilities which serve to actively misattribute and cloak actions taken in and through cyberspace 10 , the aggressor enjoys a significant advantage against defenders who rely on their ability to detect and respond at the moment of attack.
In its most challenging manifestation, aggressor strategy in cyberspace thus takes on the following characteristics:
9 The DoD's tactical airlift community refers to this phenomena as "idling at 100%" -a term denoting the fact that C-130 engines run at 100% of their rated speed at all times, creating an ability for immediate power generation by simply changing the pitch of the propeller to take greater or lesser bites of the air. 10 An example is the so-called Onion router (TOR) available as a commodity service on the internet to any party seeking to obscure their true identity or location.
 Pre-attack system-wide analysis across technology, people and processes to find critical weak points and flaws that provide favorable attack surfaces;  Diffusion of attack forces at the point of application that derive from the adversary's ability to coherently command and control numerous devices.  Agility derived from choosing, without warning, the means, time, and place of exploitation, to surprise, outmaneuver, and out-run victims;  Mixed jurisdiction governing (nee dividing) the efforts of defenders, deriving from diverse ownership and management responsibilities inherent in the construction and operation of cyberspace;  Anonymity, derived from hiding amongst large populations or active efforts to cloak one's trail, in an effort to diffuse or avoid attribution and attendant consequences.
Strategies to defend assets held in, or dependent upon some aspect of cyberspace, must deal with these inherent adversary advantages head-on. Failure to do so explains much about failures in strategies largely comprised of 'detect and respond' tactics.
Leaving aside the essential foundations of resilience in hardware, software, and procedures (e.g., information assurance), traditional defense strategies have often centered on defending perimeters and choke points, locations where an adversary can presumably be identified, constrained, and defeated. Such a defensive strategy is generally based on the availability of discriminants such as reliable chokepoints, and adversary use of a given piece of malware, tactic, or point of origination. This, in turn, requires some foreknowledge of the adversary's 'line of march' and the nature of the event that will trip the defensive action and a consequent focus on examining transactions to match against the tripwire at the chosen choke points.
To be successful in 'detect and respond' scenarios, the defender needs to have near perfect knowledge about potential adversary tactics and these need to be observable at the chosen point of examination. Moreover, the defender needs to be able to cover the spread of attacking forces which are likely to be far more diffused at the point of attack than the forces which are directing the given attack(s), ceding important leverage to the attacker. Over time, these facts have become clear to adversaries who strive to defeat the defense by adjusting their tactic(s) sufficient to bypass and/or overwhelm the defender's screen. The summary effect is that the defense is often focused on transaction processing at fixed points rather than predicting overall adversary intentions and behavior, and tracking real-time anomaly detection and behavioral flows. In the ideal situation, the ability of defenders to anticipate will hang greatly on the latter ability -one that focuses on determining the character, capabilities, and likely future actions of the aggressor, vice a focus on his tools and observable signatures alone. To be clear, each of these tacticsdetection of anomalies, behavioral characterization and anticipation -makes a valuable contribution to defense but the requirement to wrest initiative back from aggressors will require a significant move to the latter, with increased use of big data analysis and predictive techniques to enable decisions inside, or ahead of, the decision cycle of the adversary or his tools.
The demands of each of these defensive tactics on intelligence is quite different.
 Transaction processing requires a steady feed of [transaction] discriminants, which may be received as a 'push' of quantitative data harvested from sensors and/or attendant forensic analysis.  Behavioral detection requires a real-time feed and synthesis of discriminants associated with entities operating in or on the margins of a given system. The data necessary to feed this approach is best when it is holistic -covering adversaries, behaviors, and the status of protected entities (data.)  Anticipation (prediction) requires the aggregation, synthesis and analysis of all source intelligence (HUMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, open-source, and liaison reporting) covering adversary capabilities, intentions, goals, norms and values.  Achieving parity in the leverage of available forces requires timely and accurate detection of adversary command and control elements, and an ability to accurately anticipate (predict) as much or more as the ability to track and react. .
Autonomous collection, aggregation and synthesis can be quite helpful across the spectrum of these ISR outcomes, especially in enabling precious human analytic capacity to spend more time on discerning and gaming adversary strategy.
This move from reactive (post-time) to real-time cognizance requires constant ISR which is, at once, comprehensive and anticipatory.
Comprehensive: the ISR must cover adversary aspirations, capabilities, modalities, and current disposition.
Anticipatory (vice reactive): the ISR must be able to predict and discern aggressor actions with sufficient advance warning so that deterrence can be bolstered, defensive actions can be arrayed and adjusted over time, and counter-force application (offense) can be applied with highest possible leverage and greatest effect. Failure to achieve this will cede initiative to the aggressor in an environment where speed and congestion favor the aggressor.
The challenge of attribution must also be addressed, both to ensure the legitimacy of any response and to assist in crafting tactics optimized for the actor in question. Despite its longstanding identification as a major strategic thrust of the US national security strategy 11 , attribution remains uneven and widely perceived as weak. As noted in the 2003 US Strategy to Secure Cyberspace: "The speed and anonymity of cyber attacks makes distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals, and nation states difficult, a task which often occurs only after the fact, if at all." 12 This challenge is made unnecessarily difficult by a propensity to view attribution as a post-event phenomena, essentially condemning the defense to a foot race where the aggressor begins the race 'at speed' and the defender from a 'standing start'. Again, this realization should drive defenders to a preference for real-time, or ahead-of-time, and comprehensive ISR. This paper will not cover deterrence in any great detail, beyond noting that deterring potential aggressors depends heavily on the perceived (e.g., in the mind's eye of the aggressor) ability of a defender to survive and attribute attacks, and the defender's willingness and ability to respond to attacks -activities which are the focus of this paper.
The challenge of Offense -sustaining campaigns in the face of staunch defense and changing conditions While the ability to surprise and gain attendant tactical advantage is inherently ceded to the aggressor, the challenge of sustaining an offensive campaign across dynamic conditions is by no means trivial, especially in the face of a highly motivated, even if reactive, defender who can be expected to actively challenge the aggressor's initiative(s) and modify the environment in an attempt to frustrate or defeat the follow-on phases of a given campaign.
The key to sustaining tactics across campaigns is often described as one of sustaining the efficacy of tools under varying conditions caused by the defender's response and the natural variability and dynamism of cyberspace. This inappropriately pins the burden on technology alone. A better strategy is to consider the "tools" in play as the sum of the technology; intelligence (ISR); and the skills, judgment and tactics of people committed to the 'fight'. This approach puts a proper emphasis on the totality of circumstances implicated in the success of any campaign, specifically elevating ISR and operator skills and judgment to be of equal, if not greater, importance as the technology(ies) they employ.
The requirements for ISR
Melding the combined requirements for defense and offense yields the broad outlines of ISR needed to support effective operational campaigns. The ISR should meet the following substantive, temporal and contextual requirements.
Substance:
 Cover tactics, capabilities and preferred behaviors (doctrine) goals and intentions of prospective adversaries -reflecting the commander's information priorities to understand doctrine, behaviors, and modalities as much or more as order-of-battle, tools, and foundational tactics.
 This requirement immediately calls into question the authority, or even the propriety, of the operational forces seeking to obtain, analyze, and hold such information from networks they might be expected to protect or through which they will operate where they have no jurisdiction and which networks are likely to be governed by laws and policies designed to protect the privacy of network actors. This issue will be covered in a following section.
Timeliness:
 Achieve cognizance of prospective adversary intentions and actions before cyber actions that require immediate, 'at speed', responses. This, in turn, requires that effective ISR sustain a comprehensive understanding of the adversary's posture, actions, and behaviors in real-time. The goal here will be to move from ISR that responds well, to one that predicts well and sustains that insight over time.  General characterizations extrapolating episodic insights will not suffice. Operational forces with missions requiring real-time response must understand the actual conditions of the environment within which they will be expected to operate as well as the actual disposition and activities of prospective adversaries. Given the agility afforded by the environment, this cannot be based on solely an ability to 'react well' from a cold start.
Agility:
 The agility required for operational forces -across both defense and offensive rolesrequires an intimate interplay between ISR and operations, both to enable operational forces to stay abreast of adversary actions in this space and to effect synergy between the find, fix, act components of a given cyberspace operational activity. ISR assets and personnel must be organic (integrated and fully knowledgeable about blue force intentions, strategies, and disposition) to keep pace with changing conditions and needs.
In summary, the requirements for ISR require a high level of effort before any given event, essentially a "move to contact" strategy that develops and sustains near real-time cognizance of environments, actors, routines, and actions over conditions that range from peace to crisis to conflict.
The challenge of ambiguity and shared spaces
The challenges of effecting reliable and capable ISR support to operations across the spectrum of defense and offense are exacerbated by two particular limitations on the freedom of action of ISR forces.
Ambiguity of intentions:
The first derives from the ambiguity of any given action's context in cyberspace wherein the actor's intent is often unknown until the very last moment in a given sequence of actions.
For the defender, this presents a challenge of predicting an aggressor's downstream moves, e.g., properly interpreting which of several viable "next moves" an aggressor intends to make.
For the attacker, this presents the challenge of having their actions misinterpreted by the defender. This may be desirable (in support of a goal of surprise), but in the worst case will be undesirable as the defender may misread a limited action as an existential threat, thus escalating a situation in a manner unintended by the attacker. One edge case challenge here is the possibility that an effort to conduct surveillance in support of establishing defensive intelligence and warning (I&W) may be interpreted by a potential adversary as probing preparatory to an offensive action.
Shared spaces:
The second factor derives from the large intersection that prospective operating environments have with the global commons where the preponderance of infrastructure is privately owned, and where innocent parties with no play in the campaign live alongside aggressors and defenders. Legal restraints deriving from US 13 and international law and international frameworks constrain the introduction of military operations into the realm of cyberspace without necessary and proportionate cause. This restraint will be particularly acute in peacetime, at the very moment when the requirements for indication and warnings levy a large expectation on ISR to detect and thwart cyber aggression at the earliest possible moment, at a time when perceived "necessity" is wanting.
The following challenges therefore arise and must be addressed:
 ISR outside of exigent conditions will be constrained by law, treaty and convention to respect the sovereignty of nations, the property of private parties, and the privacy of protected persons.  Leaving aside potential legal constraints, ISR outside of DoD 'owned networks' needed to posture the defense might be mistaken for the leading edge of an offensive campaign.
13 The US Constitution's 3 rd amendment provision on "anti-quartering" has been interpreted by some to infer a requirement for a zone of privacy separating military operations from private domestic systems. More consequential are the provisions of the 4 th amendment which constrains the government's ability to "search and seize" information owned by or pertaining to US persons.  The context needed by US decision makers will often be impossible to determine using data provided by DoD or government controlled sources alone.  US (DoD) ISR of adversary systems that support both tactical and strategic capabilities run the risk of being perceived as "worst case threats", e.g., ISR intended to understand and hold tactical capabilities at risk may be perceived as ISR intended to hold strategic capabilities at risk -in the worst case eliciting a strategic response to a perceived existential threat. Moreover, US efforts to limit or de-escalate offensive actions may not be evident if tactical and strategic systems on either side of a given contingency are combined, (e.g., a limited attack on a system supporting critical or strategic capabilities may not be perceived as "limited" in the absence of clear unambiguous signaling that can only exist outside the channel(s) of the attack vector.)  Real time cognizance of adversary intentions, means, and attendant attribution is impossibly difficult if initiated only in reaction to a given event. In such circumstances, initiative, speed, and cover are ceded to the adversary. The ability to anticipate and respond well will require pre-event ISR that discerns the character of the environment, notable actors, and incipient actions.
Mitigating the concerns -foundations of a viable ISR strategy
Given the challenges cited above, the following recommendations are designed to address the concomitant need for comprehensive and anticipatory ISR, and the challenges that arise from it:
Embrace real-time, pre-event ISR as the necessary foundation for agility, precision, and timeliness for all US cyber operations.
Mitigate challenges of jurisdiction and restricted US views by:
 Real-time and comprehensive cognizance should be achieved through the integration of three sources: Organic resources which ingest, synthesize and analyze data from sensors on owned or permissive networks. Partner information shared under various bilateral, multilateral, or statutory created frameworks (e.g., CISA 2015), and commercially available threat information that can be harvested and analyzed much more economically in the private sector. This strategy can yield a comprehensive picture within the necessary constraints of law and jurisdiction while building trust and confidence that can be leveraged across the full range of peacetime and contingency operations.  Research and development must give a high priority to data analytics that can ingest, synthesize, and analyze diverse, imperfect (incomplete), and limited content (likely to be comprised of more metadata than content) data sets to produce a characterization of present behaviors, future trends and probable actions by relevant actors. Absent this capability, DoD and US Intelligence Community (IC) ISR efforts will be constrained to a reactive intelligence strategy owing to significant restrictions on their ability to collect, manipulate, and report rich information outside of their jurisdiction. There is a considerable body of this work underway within the private sector, the DoD and the IC 14 .
Sustain a high level of operations tempo in both peace and contingency.
 Proactive, anticipatory cyber cognizance should be perceived as the standard posture with a bias to enabling collective defense, vice a prelude to offensive action.  DoD organizations should aggressively patrol owned networks and actively and visibly pursue threats under rules of 'hot pursuit' and through collaborative relationships with adjacent network owners.
Increase transparency in the conduct of military operations through:
 Entering into confidence building measures (building and sustaining alliances …), publicly declaring priorities, and by sharing periodic threat and trend reports with the public sector and allies.  Exercise in plain view to establish understanding of DoD capabilities and rhythms, and to set expectations across supported populations, allies and potential adversaries.
Embrace, publicly support, and visibly practice broadly shared (more than US) operational norms:
 Establish broad understanding of US norms and the Department's commitment to support them across supported populations, allies and adversaries. Declaration and practice of these norms will set expectations across the public, allies and potential adversaries; and establish a foundation for deterrence. o Proscribing cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to its companies or commercial sectors.
Lead by example to reduce the propensity for miscalculation -modifying architecture and doctrine to reduce ambiguity in interpreting the actions of cyberspace actors.
 Disentangle tactical systems from strategic and critical systems. Keep infrastructure for tactical, low value endeavors, separate from strategic capabilities.  Build in clean margins for blue force systems (esp for NC3).  Define margins that distinguish defensive (constrained to specific environments) from preparation-of-the-battlefield ISR 16 .
Build and sustain collaborative partnerships that reduce the possibility of surprise and increase the probability of mutual support.
Foster close working relationships across private sector, combat support agencies, larger IC and organic assets that foster the timely (with the aspiration of pushing towards realtime) exchange of threat indicators characterizing behaviors and capabilities (these will include the organic Cyber Command assets, US IC, private sector threat information providers, private sector network owners/managers, and allies). Privacy concerns will necessarily constrain these efforts but can only be understood and reconciled through an aggressive effort to partner within the rule of law, treaties, and international convention.
Create interdependence between US private and public sectors, and between US and appropriate foreign military partners. This will increase the propensity of these systems to deliver under all conditions and establish shared norms for thresholds for warning and action.
The use of organizational embeds (integrees, exchange officers and/or liaisons) and cross-organizational exercises will build confidence and needed muscle memory for crisis and contingency situations.
Work all three components of the cyber ISR toolkit (people, doctrine and technology) -with a special focus on people and doctrine.
Focus significant time and attention on the doctrine and training governing the values, behaviors and accountability attendant to US cyber personnel. They are the critical core of the weapons system that will conduct cyber operations under varying conditions.
Their agility, initiative, and probity will fuel US and allied capabilities while building confidence in the precision and control known to be inherent in US cyber capabilities.
Conclusion
The agility, diversity and strategic capabilities of potential adversaries in and through cyberspace can only be understood, mitigated and addressed through an identical and, when needed, overmatching US ability to anticipate, outmaneuver and defeat threats in their incipient phase. The attendant need for persistent surveillance as an enabler of mission success is, at once, operationally justified and legally and practically constrained by factors arising from overlapping jurisdictions, shared infrastructure, and the inherent ambiguity of cyberspace actions.
The US DoD, working in concert with USG, private sector and allied partners must establish the ISR feeds and collaborative partnerships needed to support responsive, precise, and proportionate cyber actions that effectively support US and allied ends while not unnecessarily (unintentionally) raising concerns and precipitating escalations by other actors in the space.
The key to reconciling these multiple aims -responsive ISR, unambiguous signaling, and effective cyber operations -is to establish new norms of US ISR in its operational signatures, operations tempo, transparency, collaboration, integration of ISR and operational activities, and professional training standards. This will form a mutually supporting framework of capabilities and messaging that will improve the intrinsic power and ultimate effect of ISR and the operations they are intended to enable.
